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Colin Powell's Reflection: Status, 
Behavior, and Discrimination 
David Chang 
Proponents of civil rights for homosexuals long have sought to draw 
a parallel between race and sexual orientation. As race is a characteristic of birth 
and largely immutable, so sexual orientation has been proclaimed a characteris-
tic of birth and largely immutable. Advocates on both sides seize the latest bits 
of scientific study that might support or undermine the idea that a person's 
sexual orientation is set at birth. The issue is important, because drawing 
connections-or denying connections-between racism and homophobia has 
been widely viewed as providing-or denying-the critical moral context in 
which discrimination because of sexual orientation can be deemed contrary to 
the nation's higher constitutional ideals. 
Indeed, during the debate about lifting the ban on gays and lesbians in the 
military, a central question concerned the comparability between discrimination 
because of race and discrimination because of sexual orientation. A key figure 
in this debate was General Colin Powell. On the comparability of race and 
sexual orientation, Powell said, 
Skin color is a benign, nonbehavioral characteristic. Sexual orientation is perhaps 
the most profound of behavioral characteristics. Comparison of the two is a 
convenient but invalid argument. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as 
well as an African-American fully conversant with history, I believe the policy we 
have adopted is consistent with the necessary standards of order and discipline 
required of the armed forces.1 
Debates about the origin and immutability of sexual orientation-as well as 
focus on the choices made by homosexuals-miss the mark and preclude a 
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rigorous understanding of the relationship between discrimination because of 
race and discrimination because of sexual orientation. Discrimination because 
of sexual orientation is not so different from racial discrimination as opponents 
of gay rights would believe, nor is it so similar to racial discrimination as 
proponents of gay rights might believe. 
There was a germ of truth in Powell's attempt to distinguish between race 
and sexual orientation. Race is, indeed, not a behavioral characteristic; physical 
gender, as well, is a nonbehavioral characteristic. Although not always about 
behavior, sexual orientation is at least defined by thoughts-thoughts that 
frequently are transformed through choices into action.2 Perhaps recognizing 
this, some seek to draw a parallel between race and sexual orientation by 
arguing that homosexuality is innate and immutable. If people are born gay, as 
people are born black, the argument goes, then discrimination because of sexual 
orientation is as immoral as racial discrimination. 
On closer analysis, however, whether people are born gay is beside the point. 
There are claims that all sorts of thoughts have innate roots. Opponents of 
rights for gay men and lesbians forcefully argue that rape, for example, is not 
less a social evil if a person has an innate inclination to rape because he was 
born with an XYY chromosome. Child molestation is no less a social blight if 
the molester's inclination was formed by genetics, childhood experience, or a 
combination. Furthermore, it is undeniably true that the decision to transform 
thoughts-whether innate or not-into action involves choice. This choice to 
act is the basis for many to distinguish discrimination against gays, who choose 
to act on their sexual orientation, from discrimination against blacks or women, 
who obviously make no choice in being black or female. 
But here is where opponents of gay rights overstate their claim. Contrary to 
Powell's analysis, the issue is not simply how closely analogous are race or 
skin color and sexual orientation or behavior. Rather, the question concerns 
discrimination because of race and discrimination because of sexual orientation. 
Racial discrimination is frequently about choices, not simply the status of race. 
Once slavery ended, blacks were branded criminals not simply for being black, 
but for choosing to breach some social code of ritual manners signifying subor-
dination. 
For example, there was a time, not so long ago, when interracial marriage 
and sex were criminal in many states. Indeed, society's racism was particularly 
virulent in these contexts of marriage and sex. Under many miscegenation laws, 
blacks who married or had sex with whites were branded criminal. Some were 
lynched. This is not discrimination based on race alone-as slavery might be 
viewed as imprisonment at hard labor simply for being black. Rather, this was 
discrimination triggered by a choice deemed inappropriate for a black person. 
Despite the fact that blacks could insulate themselves from punishment by 
choosing not to breach social restrictions, this is a paradigm of what anyone 
would view as pure racial discrimination. A choice deemed appropriate for a 
white person-to marry a white person-is deemed inappropriate for a black 
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person. The essence of racial discrimination is the prohibition of choice for one 
race that another race is permitted to make. 
So choice is involved, whether one chooses interracial marriage or chooses to 
rape. But society's prohibitions of these choices are distinguishable, because the 
prohibition of rape is a universal prohibition. Rape is a choice prohibited to all, 
by virtue of being human. In contrast, the miscegenation law's prohibition of 
marriage is partial. Only nonwhite people are prohibited from marrying white 
people. Only white people are prohibited from marrying nonwhite people. The 
prohibited choices are not universal, and the discrimination as to who makes 
the various choices is a function of race. 
This discrimination because of race is morally significant because it violates 
principles of human equality fundamental in America's post-Civil War consti-
tutional tradition. It violates the idea that every individual has an equal birth-
right to pursue society's opportunities-that it is wrong to look at a newborn 
baby and conclude that there are certain choices some people are permitted to 
make that this baby, when grown, should be prohibited from making, because 
of some physical characteristic with which this baby was born. In contrast, a 
universal prohibition-such as the criminalization of rape-defines a choice 
that no one may make. Denying a choice to everyone, unlike denying a choice 
because of racist judgments about race, does not violate the principle that every 
individual has an equal birthright to pursue society's opportunities. 
Understanding the prohibition of interracial marriage as racial discrimina-
tion, even though interracial marriage is chosen, can help us better understand 
both the commonality and differences between discrimination because of race 
and discrimination because of sexual orientation. Consider the paradigmatic 
discrimination against lesbians and gay men. The discrimination against men 
marrying men, or having sex with men, and similar discrimination against 
women with women are structurally gender discrimination.3 The essence of 
gender discrimination is the prohibition of a choice for one gender that the 
other gender is permitted to make. This is parallel to the structural essence of 
racial discrimination-the prohibition of a choice by a person of one race that 
a person of another race is permitted to make. As a matter of logic, therefore, 
the prohibition of homosexual marriage or sex is as much gender discrimination 
as the prohibition of interracial marriage or sex is racial discrimination. This is 
so despite the fact that choice is involved. Indeed, this is so because the choice 
to marry or have sex that is allowed to some is denied to others because of their 
gender. 
Although the prohibition of marriage and sex between people of the same 
gender is, indeed, pure gender discrimination, discrimination against gays in 
other contexts-for example, employment in the military-is a step removed 
from pure gender discrimination. The ban on lesbians in the military is not 
pure gender discrimination, because some women are permitted to choose a 
career in the military. Similarly, the military ban on gay men is not pure gender 
discrimination, as men who make one choice deemed inappropriate for their 
434 / David Chang 
gender-same-sex intimacy-are prohibited from making the further choice 
of serving in the military.4 
Is it significant as a matter of social justice-and ultimately as a matter of 
constitutional law-that employment, housing, and other forms of discrimina-
tion against lesbians and gay men are not pure gender discrimination, but 
derived from gender discrimination? To address this question we must return 
to the context of race. The following analogy is a speculative modification of 
America's social experience, but might be essential for an understanding of the 
structural relationship between discrimination because of race and discrimina-
tion because of sexual orientation. 
Suppose that society's mores against interracial sex and marriage were more 
lasting and more intense than they actually have been. Suppose that people 
sexually attracted to people of other races were perceived as a discrete class of 
person- a wholly different kind of person. Their sexual orientation is deemed 
wrong for a person of their race. They are called interracialsexuals.5 Where this 
sexual orientation comes from is a matter of debate. But interracialsexuals are 
targets of public scorn and discrimination. Not only are they prohibited from 
marrying and having sex, they are subject to employment discrimination, 
housing discrimination, and the full range of discrimination of which people 
who hate are capable.6 
The prohibition of interracial marriage and sex involves pure racial discrimi-
nation, as previously discussed. But further discrimination against interra-
cialsexuals-in employment and housing-is a step removed from pure racial 
discrimination. People who are black are not prohibited from choosing to be, 
say, teachers. Rather, black people who choose to marry white people are 
prohibited from choosing to be teachers. 
Although such employment discrimination against interracialsexuals is not 
pure racial discrimination, but derived from pure racial discrimination in a 
particularly virulent context, Colin Powell, and others who are fully committed 
to racial equality, probably would not say that employment discrimination 
against blacks who choose to marry whites does not amount to immoral racial 
discrimination. For those fully committed to racial equality, it probably would 
not matter that race is nonbehavioral, while interraci~l sexuality is behavioral. 
Rather, the morality of this discrimination depends on the morality of the 
foundational discrimination, which is purely racial-the prohibition of interra-
cial sexual liaisons. 
Similarly, homosexuality, like interracialsexuality, might be behavioral, but 
gender, like race, is not. Although employment discrimination against homo-
sexuals is not pure gender discrimination, but is derived from gender discrimi-
nation in a particularly virulent context, a society that is fully committed to 
gender equality would not say that discrimination against women who choose 
to have relationships with women does not amount to immoral gender discrimi-
nation. For people fully committed to gender equality, it would not matter that 
gender is nonbehavioral, while homosexuality is behavioral. Rather, the moral-
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ity of discrimination against lesbians and gay men depends on the morality of 
the underlying discrimination, which is purely because of gender-the prohibi-
tion of homosexual liaisons. 
What are the legal and political implications of the observations that (1) 
discrimination against gay men and lesbians in rights of marriage and sexual 
activity is gender discrimination in a particularly enduring and intense context; 
and (2) other forms of discrimination against lesbians and gay men are not 
gender discrimination per se, but are derived from this foundational gender 
discrimination? 
First, derivative discrimination against gay men and lesbians-in employ-
ment, housing, and other contexts -perhaps cannot be squarely confronted 
until the definitional discrimination against homosexuals is first, understood 
as gender discrimination, and second, condemned as gender discrimination. 
Otherwise, opponents of gay rights will retain the forceful arguments that race 
(and, indeed, gender) is a matter of physical status, while homosexuality is a 
matter of thoughts (whether voluntary or not) and chosen actions. The moral 
principle that identifies why the state should not deny certain choices to certain 
people that it allows to others-the principle defining the immorality of dis-
crimination because of gender-remains hidden. The basis for distinguishing 
homosexual liaisons from rape or child molestation remains hidden. The moral 
common ground linking the ideas that racism is wrong, sexism is wrong, and 
heterosexism is wrong remains obscured. 
Second, because discrimination against homosexuals in the contexts of mar-
riage and sexual activity truly is a matter of gender discrimination, political 
considerations of its propriety will be informed by society's feelings about 
gender discrimination and gender roles. However committed to racial equality 
our political culture claims to be, its understanding of and commitment to 
principles of gender equality is more tenuous. The Equal Rights Amendment 
was not ratified. The nation's ideological conscience has not yet grasped the 
moral parallel between racial discrimination and gender discrimination-that 
both racist discrimination and sexist discrimination violate the principle that 
each individual has an equal birthright to pursue society's opportunities.7 
Thus one's expectations from America's legal/political community must be 
limited because of its ambivalent commitment to gender equality. Because 
discrimination against homosexuals is gender discrimination in such an intense 
and enduring context, widespread (i .e., national) changes in law and society will 
require protracted political struggle, debate, and education. Gay rights advocates 
must strongly articulate the principle that equal opportunity for all humans 
must not be restricted by prescriptions that some people should not pursue 
goals of which they are fully capable because of the body with which they were 
born-when others are permitted to pursue those goals because of the body 
with which they were born. 
No wonder, then, that advocates of rights for gay men and lesbians have had 
so much difficulty persuading opponents that traditional condemnations of 
:1 
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homosexuality as immoral are themselves immoral. The fundamental point, it 
seems to me, is that people will not understand why homophobia is immoral 
until they understand why sexism is immoral. And they will not understand 
why sexism is immoral until they understand not simply that racism is im-
moral, but why racism is immoral. 
Lazy thinking can lead one to right conclusions as well as to wrong. Our first 
task is to ensure that social truths that have been achieved through years of 
struggle become not thoughtless platitudes, but the product of moral under-
standing capable of growth. It is not enough to know that racism is wrong. The 
important point is to know why. 
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7. Furthermore, many might reject the notion that discrimination against homosex-
uals in contexts of marriage and sexual liberty is, in fact, discrimination because of 
gender. The American polity has a history of similar lapses in rationality in understand-
ing the prohibition of interracial marriages as racial discrimination. When roles are so 
deeply entrenched that they seem part of nature's order or God's Will, whether those 
roles were of racial homogeneity or sexual heterogeneity, many fail to see that discrimi-
nation based on race or gender is, indeed, because of race or gender. 
